### **AT: T – Financial Incentive**

#### 1) We meet – PPAs function as targeted at startup and operation costs – Maidia says it reduces costs and uncertainty

#### 2) Counter interpretation – Financial incentives are a disbursement of funds directly tied to an express objective

Webb**,**  – lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa, 93

(“Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501)

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures. Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies. In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created. Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used. And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration. By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive effects which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming, are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as indirect incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, the definition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well. Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and ad hoc industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to encourage behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

#### 3) For implies a direct relationship

Words and Phrase 04

(Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, “For,” Volume 17, p. 338-343)

W.D.Tenn. 1942. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 uses the words “production for commerce” as denoting an intention to deal in a restricted way with question of coverage in connection with those employed directly in production of articles to be sold, shipped or transported across state lines in commerce, producing goods “for” a certain purpose implying a direct relation as distinguished from producing something which only “affects” a certain purpose which implies an indirect relation.

#### **4) Limits – the counterinterpretation prevents an explosion of cases because it excludes aff’s that indirectly incentivize energy. Solvency advocates for loan guarantees only exist for construction**

#### 5) Predictable ground – neg arguments about energy production will always be responsive because the incentive has to be explicitly tied to energy production – their interpretation allows affs that reduce minimum wage

#### **6) Aff mechanism flexibility – their interpretation prevents the aff from being able to access important solvency mechanisms and forces obscure and contrived debates. Democracy assistance topic proves.**

#### 7) Prefer contextual support – power purchase agreements are financial incentives for nuclear power

Carroll, Senior Vice President and General Counsel at Terra-Gen Power, 05

(January, International Power & Utilities Finance Review, New nuclear power plants in the US: Governmental incentives for non-recourse project finance)

In its report dated January 10, 2005, the NETF identified the unavailability of financing as a significant obstacle to new nuclear power plant construction. The NETF recommended that the US government offer a range of financial incentives for the construction of the first few reactors, such as: secured loans, loan guarantees, accelerated depreciation, investment tax credits, production tax credits and government power purchase agreements.

#### **Default to reasonability –**

#### good is good enough, vote aff if our interp is reasonable in a vacuum – search for the most limiting interpretation allows the neg to move the goal post to exclude the aff, all debate has judge intervention, no less arbitrary than saying limits are key

### AT: Iran Strikes Good

**Iran strikes causes multiple scenarios for extinction.**

**Chossudovsky 06**, Michel Chossudovsky is a professor of economics at the University of Ottawa. Chossudovsky has been a visiting professor internationally, and has been an advisor to governments of developing countries, “The Next Phase of the Middle East War, Global Research”, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=3147>)

The Bush Administration has embarked upon **a military adventure which threatens the future of humanity**. This is not an overstatement. **If aerial bombardments were to be launched against Iran, they would trigger a ground war and the escalation of the conflict to a much broader region. Even in the case of aerial and missile attacks using conventional warheads, the bombings would unleash a "Chernobyl type" nuclear nightmare resulting from the spread of nuclear radiation** following the destruction of Iran's nuclear energy facilities. Throughout history, the structure of military alliances has played a crucial role in triggering major military conflicts. In contrast to the situation prevailing prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, America's ongoing military adventure is now firmly supported by the Franco-German alliance. Moreover, Israel is slated to play a direct role in this military operation. NATO is firmly aligned with the Anglo-American-Israeli military axis, which also includes Australia and Canada. In 2005, NATO signed a military cooperation agreement with Israel, and Israel has a longstanding bilateral military agreement with Turkey. Iran has observer status in The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and is slated to become a full member of SCO. China and Russia have far-reaching military cooperation agreements with Iran. China and Russia are firmly opposed to a US-led military operation in the diplomatic arena. While the US sponsored military plan threatens Russian and Chinese interests in Central Asia and the Caspian sea basin, it is unlikely that they would intervene militarily on the side of Iran or Syria. **The planned attack on Iran must be understood in relation to the existing active war theaters in the Middle East, namely Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon-Palestine.**  **The conflict could easily spread from the Middle East to the Caspian sea basin. It could also involve the participation of Azerbaijan and Georgia, where US troops are stationed.**  **Military action against Iran** and Syria **would directly involve Israel's participation, which in turn would trigger a broader war throughout the Middle East, not to mention the further implosion in the Palestinian occupied territories**. Turkey is closely associated with the proposed aerial attacks. If the US-UK-Israeli war plans were to proceed, th**e broader Middle East- Central Asian region would flare up, from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Afghan-Chinese border.** At present, there are three distinct war theaters: Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine-Lebanon. **An attack directed against Iran would serve to integrate these war theaters transforming the broader Middle East Central Asian region into an integrated war zone.** (see map above) **In turn the US sponsored aerial bombardments directed against Iran could contribute to triggering a ground war** characterized by Iranian attacks directed against coalition troops in Iraq. In turn, Israeli forces would enter into Syria. An attack on Iran would have a direct impact on the resistance movement inside Iraq. **It would** also **put pressure on America's overstretched military capabilities and resources in both the Iraqi and Afghan war theaters.**  In other words, **the shaky geopolitics of the Central Asia- Middle East region, the three existing war theaters in which America is currently, involved, the direct participation of Israel and Turkey, the structure of US sponsored military alliances**, etc. **raises the specter of a broader conflict. The war against Iran is part of a longer term US military agenda which seeks to militarize the entire Caspian sea basin, eventually leading to the destabilization and conquest of the Russian Federation**.

**Iran will massively escalate – won’t believe strike is limited**

**Kahl, associate professor at Georgetown Walsh school of Foreign Service, 12** Colin H. Kahl is an Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. In 2009-11, he was U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, Foreign Affairs, “Not Time to Attack Iran” 1-17-2012, http://thecommongood.net/2012/01/not-time-to-attack-iran/)

RIDING THE ESCALATOR Kroenig's discussion of timing is not the only **misleading** part of his article; so **is his contention** that **the U**nited **S**tates **could mitigate the "potentially devastating consequences**" of a strike on Iran **by carefully managing the escalation** that would ensue. His **picture of a clean, calibrated conflict is a mirage. Any war with Iran would be** a **messy and extraordinarily violent** affair, **with significant casualties and consequences.** According to Kroenig, Iran would not respond to a strike with its "worst forms of retaliation, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz or launching missiles at southern Europe" unless its leaders felt that the regime's "very existence was threatened." To mitigate this risk, he claims, the United States could "make clear that it is interested only in destroying Iran's nuclear program, not in overthrowing the government." But **Iranian leaders have staked** their **domestic legitimacy on resisting** international **pressure to halt the nuclear program,** and so **they would inevitably view an attack on that program as an attack on the regime itself**. **Decades of hostility and** perceived **U.S. efforts to undermine the regime would reinforce this perception**. And when **combined with** the emphasis on **anti-Americanism in the ideology of the supreme leader and** his **hard-line advisers**, as well as their general **ignorance about** what drives **U.S. decision-making**, this perception means that **there is little prospect** that **Iranian leaders would believe** that **a U.S. strike had limited aims. Assuming the worst about Washington's intentions, Tehran is likely to overreact to even a surgical strike** against its nuclear facilities.

### AT: States CP

#### 1) Perm - do both – resolves the link to the net benefit because the president and the states are seen as acting in lock-step – doesn’t get blamed

**50 state fiat is a voter:**

**Interpretation: The counterplan needs a solvency advocate about the plan**

**1. Kills education – no opportunity cost between US or a the states doing a policy – key to reconciling the possible and the ideal– disads check international education**

**2. Kills fairness – unlimited number of sub-federal actors – unbearable research burden for the aff, fiat solves solvency deficits**

#### 3) The counterplan can’t solve the bases advantage – there’s no evidence that the DOD would utilize SMRs

#### 4) Lock out - DOD has to be a first mover or they won’t be able to use SMR’s

Andres & Breetz, Security Prof @ National War College, ’11

[Richard B. Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College, Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, Hanna L. Breetz, Political Science PhD Candidate at MIT, “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications,” Strategic Forum, INSS, February 2011]

Technological Lock-in. A second risk is that if small reactors do reach the market without DOD assistance, the designs that succeed may not be optimal for DOD’s applications. Due to a variety of positive feedback and increasing returns to adoption (including demonstration effects, technological interdependence, network and learning effects, and economies of scale), the designs that are initially developed can become “locked in.”34 Competing designs—even if they are superior in some respects or better for certain market segments— can face barriers to entry that lock them out of the market. If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred designs are not locked out, then it should take a first mover role on small reactors. It is far too early to gauge whether the private market and DOD have aligned interests in reactor designs. On one hand, Matthew Bunn and Martin Malin argue that what the world needs is cheaper, safer, more secure, and more proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors; presumably, many of the same broad qualities would be favored by DOD.35 There are many varied market niches that could be filled by small reactors, because there are many different applications and settings in which they can be used, and it is quite possible that some of those niches will be compatible with DOD’s interests.36 On the other hand, DOD may have specific needs (transportability, for instance) that would not be a high priority for any other market segment. Moreover, while DOD has unique technical and organizational capabilities that could enable it to pursue more radically innovative reactor lines, DOE has indicated that it will focus its initial small reactor deployment efforts on LWR designs.37 If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred reactors are developed and available in the future, it should take a leadership role now. Taking a first mover role does not necessarily mean that DOD would be “picking a winner” among small reactors, as the market will probably pursue multiple types of small reactors. Nevertheless, DOD leadership would likely have a profound effect on the industry’s timeline and trajectory.

#### 5) Valley of Death - Only DOD action can overcome technical and financial uncertainty that prevents SMR development in the absence of DOD leadership – that’s Andres and Breetz and Loudermilk

#### 6) CP links to [Whatever the Net Benefit is]

#### No solvency – evidence is in the context of the USFG reducing uncertainty through PPAs – no reason states obey

### AT: Obama Good Elections

#### Case outweighs –

#### Prolif multiplies the risk of war – that’s Below – magnitude is higher when there’s potential for nuclear escalation

#### Cyber-attacks are immediate – China will invade Taiwan while the grid is shut down – that’s Gorman and Barnes – US would retaliate in the short term

#### N/U – foreign policy crises will tank Obama

Morrissey, 9/18 (Ed, 9/18/2012, “Will this become a foreign-policy election?” <http://hotair.com/archives/2012/09/18/will-this-become-a-foreign-policy-election/> )

We’ve assumed throughout this election cycle that the economy and jobs would drive voter choice, but that would mean a referendum on the current incumbent, something Democrats desperately wanted to avoid. Two weeks ago, Democrats promised us that they would make foreign policy the focus of the election. As I note in my column for The Week, that didn’t come from low-level party functionaries, but from the prime-time speakers — including Barack Obama himself:

Ironically, Democrats had promised a fight on foreign policy just a week earlier, at their national convention. Sen. John Kerry, the party’s nominee in 2004, called the Republican ticket “the most inexperienced foreign-policy twosome to run for president and vice president in decades.” Barack Obama himself attacked Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan as “new to foreign policy,” and warned that “they want to take us back to an era of blustering and blundering that cost America so dearly.” Democrats salivated at the prospect of highlighting Obama’s foreign-policy experience — all of which he compiled over the last three-and-a-half years — as a contrast to the GOP’s nominees, and a transparent attempt to deflect the election away from the economy.

As an old axiom warns, be careful what you wish for — you just might get it. With the explosion of violent protests in the Muslim world and the first US Ambassador killed in the line of duty since 1979, foreign policy has finally intruded in a big way in this election — and it doesn’t make Obama look good at all. When the Washington Post’s liberal columnist Richard Cohen rips a Democratic President for a feckless foreign policy, it’s a stark indicator of just how badly Obama has failed on this front:

What lessons can be learned from events in Libya? That nothing good will come out of the Arab Spring? That Arabs are volatile, easily excitable and prone to acting out? That the United States, Mitt Romney notwithstanding, cannot control everything or that the United States, Mitt Romney more to the point, has tried to control nothing? In other words, is this what happens when the United States is “leading from behind”?

This phrase, you might remember, was coined in reference to Barack Obama’s reluctance to take the lead in the NATO air campaign that toppled the dictatorship of Moammar Gaddafi. And that operation, in which the French seized the initiative, was mounted to save Benghazi, the city where the insurrection started and the one where U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans were killed last week. Benghazi was saved from Gaddafi’s bloody reprisals, but not from mayhem.

The notion that the United States can lead from behind is pitiful, the sorry concoction of an Obama administration that mistakes dulcet passivity for a foreign policy. The view from behind now has to be awfully depressing. Where once Obama could see the gallant tails of the French, the British, the Italians and some others, there is now no one. The predictably indignant Nicolas Sarkozy has been replaced by the soullessly pragmatic Francois Hollande, who has other fish to saute. NATO’s warplanes have returned to base and Libya, a tribal society, was left to fend for itself. It has not fended all that well.

Cohen predictably rips Romney for pointing this out, but concludes that Romney is very much right about Obama’s foreign policy of passivity:

Romney was wrong and ham-fisted and alarmingly premature to criticize Obama for a statement put out by the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. He is both wrong and dishonest to keep repeating the canard about Obama being a serial apologizer. But he is right in sensing that beyond the very Obamaness of Obama himself — the quality that made him a Nobel Peace Prize winner in the pupal stage of his presidency — lurks a foreign policy that has been more sentiment and aspiration than hard reasoning. Leading from behind is not a nifty phrase. In Libya, it’s an indictment.

Michael Ramirez distills the lessons from a week of making the Obama foreign-policy expertise the center of attention:

But will this become a foreign-policy election? In my column, I argue no — at least not for now — but that it might end up backfiring on Obama anyway:

By Monday, the Washington Post reported that the Obama campaign would shift its focus to the economy, a stark about-face from just a fortnight earlier in Charlotte, N.C.

Have events changed the nature of the election from a focus primarily on domestic policy to a debate on Obama’s handling of foreign policy? If more revelations of incompetence arise, perhaps — but at this point, that seems doubtful. When crises do erupt, they tend to take a long time to damage presidents; Jimmy Carter’s polling looked solid in September 1980, despite 10 months of a hostage crisis in Iran that echoes in today’s multiple diplomatic crises. Although foreign policy is the one area in which presidents have most authority, voters tend to grade incumbents on whether they have improved their economic situation. Voters want to know who lost the economic recovery more than they want to discuss who lost Egypt, because that has a lot more relevance to their immediate circumstances. But if the bungling continues at the White House and State Department, the risk rises that a perception of incompetence in the administration’s foreign policy will reinforce an impression of incompetence in economic policy, and create the kind of narrative that made Carter a one-term president.

In short, the argument for an economy-based election always relied on making an argument that Barack Obama has performed incompetently. These episodes reinforce the sense of incompetence and broaden it to an area that Democrats figured would be a strength for Obama in this election. That may provide a hinge that could spell doom for Obama in the election, especially if further data shows that the White House and State missed opportunities to prevent what happened in Benghazi.

#### Romney will win --- best unskewed data proves

Chambers, 9/18 (Dean, 9/18/2012, “Mitt Romney vs. Barack Obama: An unskewed look at the latest polls,” <http://www.examiner.com/article/mitt-romney-vs-barack-obama-an-unskewed-look-at-the-latest-polls>)

There are exactly seven weeks left today before election day in November. As we get close to that day, the polls for the presidential race get increasingly more attention. The Rasmussen Reports Daily Presidential Tracking Poll released today shows Mitt Romney leading over President Obama by a 47 percent to 45 percent margin. That same poll also shows Obama's approval rating at 49 percent and his disapproval rating to be 50 percent. Even the skewed Gallup tracking poll, reported today, shows Obama leading by only one percent, at 47 percent to 46 percent for Romney.

The UnSkewed Average of polls released today shows a Mitt Romney lead over Barack Obama of 51.5 percent to 43.7 percent. The UnSkewed average of polls includes the unskewed data from several mainstream media and other major polls of the presidential race along with the QStarNews presidential poll. Here is an example illustrating the process of “unskewing” a skewed poll that over-sampled Democrats.

New Jersey-based Monmouth University released a new poll of the presidential race yesterday showing President Obama leading 48 percent to 41 percent among registered voters and 48 percent to 45 percent over Mitt Romney among likely voters. Unskewing this poll leads to a result showing Romney leading with a 46 percent to 45 percent margin over President Obama with registered voters, and likewise a 50 percent to 45 perfect Romney lead among likely voters.

The QStarNews Quick Poll of the presidential race released yesterday shows Mitt Romney with a solid 11 point lead, 55 percent to 44 percent, over President Obama. The poll, the first conducted by QStarNews, was a web-based survey that included 2075 respondents and a margin of error of three percent. The respondents participated in the survey between September 10-15. Additionally, the survey found 55 percent disapproving of the performance of President Obama while 45 percent approved of the president's job in office.

The latest New York Times/CBS News poll of the presidential race released recently is yet another doctored poll that shows President Obama leading when its data indicates a Mitt Romney lead. The survey of 1170 registered voters, polled between September 8-12, has Obama leading over Romney by a 49 percent to 46 percent margin. Unskewing the data indicates a Romney lead over Obama by 51 percent to 44 percent.

The new Democracy Corps survey of the presidential race released recently shows President Obama leading by a 50 percent to 45 percent lead over Mitt Romney. Additionally, the poll shows Obama with a 49 percent approval rating and a 48 percent disapproval rating. The survey of 1000 likely voters, reported today and conducted between September 8-12, includes 41 percent Democrats, 30 percent Republicans and 28 percent independent voters. This is a heavy over-sampling of Democrats by 13 percent in the sample used for in this Democracy Corps poll. When the data from this poll is unskewed, the results calculate to Romney leading Obama by a 52 percent to 43 percent with about five percent undecided.

The Fox News poll released today continues the trend of skewed polls that over-sample Democratic voters to produce results favorable to the president. The poll reports President Obama leading over Mitt Romney by a margin of 48 percent to 43 percent. But this is based on a sample that includes eight percent more Democrats than it does Republicans for an electorate that is made up of two percent more Republicans than Democrats. Unskewing of this poll's data leads to Romney leading Obama by a 48 percent to 45 percent with about seven percent undecided.

More so than past election cycles the national polls, especially those conducted by mainstream media outlets, have heavily over-sampled Democrats on the assumptions of higher than likely Democratic voter turnout, and in turn have shown results heavily skewed toward the Democrats. The unskewing method of analysis of these polls used here in this column is simply a way balancing the data from these polls, gathered by the pollsters that conducted them, and weighting them to reflect the actual makeup of the electorate in the interest of producing the most accurate measures of public opinion.

The current UnSkewed Average of Polls reported today by UnSkewedPolls.com shows Mitt Romney leading by 7.8 percent over President Romney. That average indicates that a popular vote victory for Mitt Romney by a 53 percent to 45 percent margin over Barack Obama is likely if the election were held today. That differs greatly with the Real Clear Politics average of polls that shows a 2.9 percent Barack Obama lead. This is because at least nine of the 11 polls included in the average are heavily skewed polls conducted by mainstream media outlets that massively over-sample Democratic voters to produce results more favorable to President Obama. Most of those same polls, in unskewed form, are included in the UnSkewed Average of Polls.

#### Obama’s lead is just a sugar high from the convention --- and Republican voters are more enthused

WSJ, 9/20 (Patrick O’Connor and Janet Hook, 9/20/2012, “Headwinds for Romney in Latest Poll Results,” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443890304578008773934388786.html?mod=googlenews_wsj> )

The Romney camp dismisses most of the recent polling as a "sugar high" for Mr. Obama left over from the party conventions. "Polls are going to go this way and that way," Mr. Romney's running mate, Rep. Paul Ryan, told donors during a fundraiser Thursday night in Washington. "But at the end of the day, if we do our jobs right, and we will, the country will have a really clear choice."

Among other factors, Romney supporters point to polling that shows Republicans hold a modest edge in voter enthusiasm and data that shows a large percentage of Americans still think the country is moving in the wrong direction. "We feel like we're in a very close contest," said Ed Gillespie, a senior adviser to the Romney campaign. "We feel like Romney is likely to win."

#### No link – Obama avoids crises

Rogers, 9/17 (Ed, 9/17/2012, “Obama's 21st-century Teflon is working,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-insiders/post/obamas-21st-century-teflon-is-working/2012/09/17/82b05da8-00bf-11e2-bbf0-e33b4ee2f0e8_blog.html?wprss=rss_opinions> )

It is safe to say that America's outreach to the world under President Obama has been a complete failure. Does America enjoy more or less respect than it did four years ago? If you think more, please let me know where.

Last weekend was the end of Obama's foreign policy. Diplomats are being called in and troops are being sent out — at least to where our enemies will allow them. The likes of Sudan know they can refuse Obama's wish for more troops to protect our embassies. Obama will probably tell us the Sudanese promise to provide adequate protection for Americans was a hard-fought concession.

Anyway, for the first time since the 2012 campaign began, Obama might want to talk about the economy. The images of the fires burning and the angry crowds on the Arab streets all underscore the complete failure of Obama's foreign policy, reminding us of his naivete and the price we pay for his on-the-job-training. Remember, this is a man who thought he was worthy of the Nobel Peace Prize just for being who he was.

The planet would heal because of his desire for it to do so. His very presence meant tension in the Middle East would subside. And why not? He had some new ideas: Remember his instructions to his NASA administrator that there was no higher priority than to make Arabs feel better about themselves?

With the world mostly either disrespecting America or just sadly shaking its head and wondering where America has gone, perhaps the Obama campaign could use a few days of blaming George W. Bush for the Obama administration's economic failures.

Foreign policy can't win elections, but it can lose them. Obama is pushing his luck as it becomes more and more clear that he can't influence events that endanger America and American interests. Meanwhile, he has outsourced America's economic management to the Federal Reserve, an abdication of responsibility that will be the subject of books to come. By announcing another quantitative easing program, the Federal Reserve was irrefutably saying that Obama's policies are not working, that the economy is so weak it has to step in to do something to try and generate the jobs that Obama's policies haven't — and won't — deliver.

So as the campaign heads for the debates, voters must be asking themselves what a vote for Obama is really about. It's not about peace and prosperity. It's not about respect abroad and certainty at home. There is nothing about Obama's tenure in office that voters should want more of. So why is he winning? I'm not sure, but based on his record at home and the sorry state of affairs his foreign policy has produced, the fact that he isn't cratering suggests a 21st-century coat of Teflon that makes Reagan's legendary resilience look small-time.

#### Energy obvi not key

#### Military spending is immune to political backlash

Norris, Executive director of Sustainable Security program at Center for American Progress, 12

(7/31, Money Pit on the Potomac, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/31/money\_pit\_on\_the\_potomac?page=0,0)

July was a tough month for the Pentagon. The Washington Post revealed that three U.S. special operations soldiers died in Mali when their vehicle plunged off a bridge with three Moroccan prostitutes in the vehicle at the time. The special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction issued one of his final reports on U.S. reconstruction efforts in that country and estimated that $6 billion to $8 billion of the $51 billion spent on reconstruction was likely wasted, embezzled, or misplaced. The inspector general's investigations have produced 90 indictments, 72 convictions, and $177 million in fines and other penalties, with the highest percentage of convictions coming against military officers and defense contractors. Worse still, this came not long after the bean counters at the Government Accountability Office had issued yet another damning report on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, finding that the cost estimate for developing the F-35 had jumped an additional $15 billion since 2010. The reaction from the political class was swift and decisive, but not in the way you would think. Republican standard-bearer Mitt Romney called for an additional $2.1 trillion in defense spending over the next decade and called for adding 100,000 additional active-duty military personnel -- even as the United States winds down wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, Adam Smith, made an impassioned plea supporting the Defense Department's foreign assistance programs. And much of Congress continues to react as if sequestration budget cuts -- a sword of Damocles that they themselves voted for -- would prove apocalyptic even though they only reduce Pentagon spending to 2006 levels. The Pentagon has become the federal bureaucracy's version of a perpetual motion machine. Despite the fact that the military budget has roughly doubled over the last decade and the United States spends more on defense than China, Britain, France, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Germany, India, and Brazil combined, most members of Congress continue to see a vote for more defense spending as the safest vote in town. And for good reason. But because voting for defense spending is a painless vote for members of Congress, more and more lobbyists and interest groups have pushed their activities under the broad umbrella of the Pentagon in order to find safe harbor. This has led to the Pentagon to take on more and more activities that have very little to do with traditional definitions of national security. Take breast cancer, for example. As the Post notes, the Pentagon has received more than $3.6 billion for cancer research over the last 20 years, despite the fact that no president has ever requested this funding and that breast cancer research has nothing to do with the Pentagon's traditional limited purview in health -- battlefield medicine. Iowa Sen. Tom Harkin once bragged to his constituents that he had been able to double spending on breast cancer research by putting the additional funds in the Pentagon's budget. Of course, since the Defense Department doesn't have much expertise in breast cancer research, it turns around and relies on agencies like the National Institutes of Health, where the money should have been put in the first place, to oversee its grants under these programs. But Congress is not solely to blame for the Pentagon's ever growing mandate. The Defense Department itself has become increasingly fixated on the idea of "expeditionary economics." In a nutshell, the concept is that small teams of military professionals well versed in economics will be deployed to assist in the reconstruction of war-torn and disaster-prone countries. Any post-conflict expert worth his or her salt agrees that getting economic life restarted after a conflict is vital. However, the idea of putting an institution that has become synonymous with billion-dollar cost overruns in charge of setting economic policy in postwar settings seems risible. Indeed, there is probably no agency in the world that has been more insulated from basic economic realities over the last decade than the Pentagon. But still, no other federal agency is willing to say that the emperor across the Potomac has no clothes. Let us remember that Pentagon-led projects in Iraq and Afghanistan have been flush with cash but rife with problems. Just this week, the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction reported that about $400 million in large infrastructure projects in Afghanistan are badly behind schedule and unlikely to make a dent in the Taliban insurgency. And this only underscores the Pentagon's power to get what it wants. When every other agency fails, Congress threatens to reduce its budget. When the Defense Department fails or makes grievous mistakes, it is automatically assumed that it went astray because it did not have enough money. But both Congress and the Pentagon itself should recognize the fundamental long-term risk of turning America's military budget into a catchall for everything from breast cancer research to roving teams of economists in combat boots. Military officers are great at fighting and winning wars because that is what they are trained to do. It's bad enough that there are already more people in U.S. military bands than in the entire Foreign Service, but does the country really want to train fighting men and women to build swimming pools in Iraq? The more amorphous America makes the U.S. military's purpose as an institution, the more likely the Pentagon will turn into a giant, muddled marshmallow of bureaucratic excess. Back in the 1990s, Republicans routinely wrung their hands over the idea that "mission creep" was undermining the military. Those concerns seem to have been quietly set aside as both parties acquiesce in building a military that can't say no. With major budget battles brewing, don't be surprised when people try to slip everything from domestic road building to arts funding into the behemoth defense budget.

#### Strong public support for federal nuclear power incentives – no effect from Fukushima

WNA 12

(September, World Nuclear Association, US Nuclear Power Policy, www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41\_US\_nuclear\_power\_policy.html)

Public opinion regarding nuclear power has generally been fairly positive, and has grown more so as people have had to think about security of energy supplies. Different polls show continuing increase in public opinion favourable to nuclear power in the USA. More than three times as many strongly support nuclear energy than strongly oppose it. Two-thirds of self-described environmentalists favour it. A May 2008 survey (N=2925) by Zogby International showed 67% of Americans favoured building new nuclear power plants, with 46% registering strong support; 23% were opposed. Asked which kind of power plant they would prefer if it were sited in their community, 43% said nuclear, 26% gas, 8% coal. Men (60%) were more than twice as likely as women (28%) to be supportive of a nuclear power plant. A March 2010 Bisconti-GfK Roper survey showed that strong public support for nuclear energy was being sustained, with 74% in favour of it11. In particular, 87% think nuclear will be important in meeting electricity needs in the years ahead, 87% support licence renewal for nuclear plants, 84% believe utilities should prepare to build more nuclear plants, 72% supported an active federal role in encouraging investment in "energy technology that reduces greenhouse gases", 82% agree that US nuclear plants are safe and secure, 77% would support adding a new reactor at the nearest nuclear plant, and 70% say that USA should definitely build more plants in the future. Only 10% of people said they strongly opposed the use of nuclear energy. In relation to recycling used nuclear fuel, 79% supported this (contra past US policy), and the figure rose to 85% if "a panel of independent experts" recommended it. Although 59% were confident that used reactor fuel could be stored safely at nuclear power plant sites, 81% expressed a strong desire for the federal government to move used nuclear fuel to centralised, secure storage facilities away from the plant sites until a permanent disposal facility is ready. Half of those surveyed considered themselves to be environmentalists. A February 2011 Bisconti-GfK Roper survey showed similar figures, and that 89% of Americans agree that all low-carbon energy sources – including nuclear, hydro and renewable energy – should be taken advantage of to generate electricity while limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Just 10% disagreed. Also some 84% of respondents said that they associate nuclear energy "a lot" or "a little" with reliable electricity; 79% associate nuclear energy with affordable electricity; 79% associate nuclear energy with economic growth and job creation; and 77% associate nuclear energy and clean air. A more general March 2010 Gallup poll (N=1014) on energy showed 62% in favour of using nuclear power, including 28% strongly so, and 33% against, the most favourable figures since Gallup began polling the question in 1994. However, only 51% of Democrat voters were in favour12. An early March 2011 Gallup poll just before the Fukushima accident showed 57% in favour and 38% against, and in March 2012 (N=1024) still 57% in favour with 40% against (men: 72%-27%, women 42%-51%). Regarding plant safety, the polls showed consistent 56-58% positive views over 2009-12, but men-women split similar. A survey conducted in September 2011 by Bisconti Research Inc. with GfK Roper showed that although support for nuclear power decreased following the Fukushima accident and compared with a year earlier (a survey carried out in March 2010 by Bisconti Research found 74% of Americans favoured nuclear power), 62% of the 1000 adults surveyed in the latest poll were supportive of utilizing nuclear power while 35% expressed opposition. The survey found that 82% of Americans believed that lessons had been learned from Fukushima and 67% of respondents considered US nuclear power plants safe (the same level as reported one month before the nuclear accident in Japan occurred). Also 85% of said that an extension of commercial operation should be granted to those plants that comply with federal safety standards, and 59% believed more nuclear power plants should definitely be built in the future, while 75% contend that “Electric utilities should prepare now so that new nuclear power plants could be built if needed in the next decade.” Finally, further expansion of the site of the nearest already operating nuclear power plant is supported by 67% and opposed by 28%.

#### No president can get anything done after the election – especially economy

Dadush, et. al, 8/2---director of Carnegie’s International Economics Program (8/2/2012, Uri Dadush, Shimelse Ali --- economist in the International Economics Program, and Zaahira Wyne --- managing editor of Carnegie’s International Economic Bulletin, “What Does the U.S. Election Mean for the World Economy?” <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/02/what-does-u.s.-election-mean-for-world-economy/d5mp> )

Few things are certain, especially given the threat to the U.S. economy posed by the crisis in Europe. But some pundits have already begun forecasting that Obama will beat Romney by a fair number of electoral votes despite a dead heat in the popular vote. The FiveThirtyEight blog in the New York Times, one of the few outlets venturing a forecast for toss-up states, projects 294 electoral votes for Obama versus 244 for Romney and a one-percentage-point win for Obama in the popular vote. The Washington Post’s The Fix blog offers a more cautious assessment, one that nonetheless shows Obama winning and closer to the decisive 270 mark. However, Republicans are expected to easily retain control of the House of Representatives and may also regain control of the Senate by a small margin.

Two crucial points emerge. First, even if Obama wins and Democrats retain the Senate, the president will have to seek a compromise with a Republican House. Second, in no scenario, including a Romney win, would either party gain a filibuster-proof 60 seats in the Senate. This means that the victorious candidate, whoever he is, would have to try to compromise with senators of the opposite party, not to mention members of his own party whose views may differ on a particular issue, in order to pass meaningful legislation.

It follows that the implications of the U.S. elections for the global economy depend less on precise electoral platforms than on the shape of the compromise reached on the big issues, and, against a background of fraying consensus, whether compromise can be reached at all. Thus, the U.S. electoral outcome is likely far less predictive of policy than, say, the Socialists’ sweep in France in May or even last year’s Conservative/Liberal Democrat victory in the UK.

#### Decline doesn’t cause war

Daniel Deudney, Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton, April 1991, “Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, p. 27, google books,

Poverty Wars. In a second scenario, declining living standards first cause internal turmoil. then war. If groups at all levels of affluence protect their standard of living by pushing deprivation on other groups class war and revolutionary upheavals could result. Faced with these pressures, liberal democracy and free market systems could increasingly be replaced by authoritarian systems capable of maintaining minimum order.9 If authoritarian regimes are more war-prone because they lack democratic control, and if revolutionary regimes are warprone because of their ideological fervor and isolation, then the world is likely to become more violent. The record of previous depressions supports the proposition that widespread economic stagnation and unmet economic expectations contribute to international conflict. Although initially compelling, this scenario has major flaws. One is that it is arguably based on unsound economic theory. Wealth is formed not so much by the availability of cheap natural resources as by capital formation through savings and more efficient production. Many resource-poor countries, like Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with more extensive resources are poor. Environmental constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing use of raw materials, but not necessarily an end to growth in the production of goods and services. In addition, economic decline does not necessarily produce conflict. How societies respond to economic decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And as people get poorer, they may become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces. As Bernard Brodie observed about the modein era, “The predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones.”’” The experience of economic depressions over the last two centuries may be irrelevant, because such depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930 increased military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military spending will exacerbate the problem. Power Wars. A third scenario is that environmental degradation might cause war by altering the relative power of states; that is, newly stronger states may be tempted to prey upon the newly weaker ones, or weakened states may attack and lock in their positions before their power ebbs firther. But such alterations might not lead to war as readily as the lessons of history suggest, because economic power and military power are not as tightly coupled as in the past. The economic power positions of Germany and Japan have changed greatly since World War 11, but these changes have not been accompanied by war or threat of war. In the contemporary world, whole industries rise, fall, and relocate, causing substantial fluctuations in the economic well-being of regions and peoples without producing wars. There is no reason to believe that changes in relative wealth and power caused by the uneven impact of environmental degradation would inevitably lead to war. Even if environmental degradation were to destroy the basic social and economic fabric of a country or region, the impact on international order may not be very great. Among the first casualties in such country would be the capacity to wage war. The poor and wretched of the earth may be able to deny an outside aggressor an easy conquest, but they are themselves a minimal threat to other states. Contemporary offensive military operations require complex organizational skills, specialized industrial products and surplus wealth.

### AT: Complexity K 2AC

#### Our framework is that the alternative should be judged on the efficacy of its response to existing institutional practices

#### This means that the neg should have to answer the following questions – what is the alternative institution/social order that should be put into place? Is that feasible? What would have to be done to create that change and what would be the consequences of those actions?

#### Absent these questions shifts in knowledge production are useless – governments’ obey institutional logics that exist independently of individuals and constrain decisionmaking – that’s true regardless of this debate

Wight – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney – 6

(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This ‘lattice-work’ of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures. This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a ‘social field’. According to Bourdieu, a social field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined’. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, ‘a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

#### Predictions can be qualitative – you can make predictions based on different probabilities

#### **Applying complexity theory leads to policy paralysis and numerous other failures**

HENDRICK ‘9 (Diane; Department of Peace Studies – University of Bradford, “Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation: An Exploration of Potential and Implications,” June, <http://143.53.238.22/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR17.pdf>)

It is still relatively early days in the application of complexity theory to social sciences and there are doubts and criticisms, either about the applicability of the ideas or about the expectations generated for them. It is true that the translation of terms from natural science to social science is sometimes contested due to the significant differences in these domains, and that there are concerns that the meanings of terms may be distorted, thus making their use arbitrary or even misleading. Developing new, relevant definitions for the new domain applications, where the terms indicate a new idea or a new synthesis that takes our understanding forward, are required. In some cases, particular aspects of complexity theory are seen as of only limited applicability, for example, self-organisation (see Rosenau‘s argument above that it is only relevant in systems in which authority does not play a role). There are those who argue that much that is being touted as new is actually already known, whether from systems theory or from experience, and so complexity theory cannot be seen as adding value in that way. There are also concerns that the theory has not been worked out in sufficient detail, or with sufficient rigour, to make itself useful yet. Even that it encourages woolly thinking and imprecision.

In terms of application in the field, it could be argued that it may lead to paralysis, in fear of all the unexpected things that could happen, and all the unintended consequences that could result, from a particular intervention. The proposed adaptability and sensitivity to emerging new situations may lead to difficulties in planning or, better expressed, must lead to a different conception of what constitutes planning, which is, in itself, challenging (or even threatening) for many fields. The criteria for funding projects or research may not fit comfortably with a complexity approach, and evaluation, already difficult especially in the field of conflict transformation, would require a re-conceptualisation. Pressure for results could act as a disincentive to change project design in the light of emergent processes. There may be the desire to maintain the illusion of control in order to retain the confidence of funders. On the other hand, there are fears that complexity may be used as an excuse for poor planning, and implementation, which is a valid concern for funders. In addition, there may be scepticism that the co-operation and co-ordination between different researchers or interveners, (let alone transdisciplinary undertakings) appropriate to working on complex problem domains, will not work due to differing mental models, competing interests and aims, competition for funding, prestige, etc. Such attempts appear, therefore, unrealistic or unfeasible.

#### Defer to best evidence to resolve impacts – only way to avoid dogmatism and create effective policy analysis

Sil ‘2k

Rudra Sil, assistance professor of Political Science @ the University of Pennsylvania. “Beyond boundaries?: disciplines, paradigms, and theoretical integration in International Studies. 2001. P. 161.

In the end, there may be no alternative to relying on the judgment of other human beings, and this judgment is difficult to form in the absence of empirical findings. However, instead of clinging to the elusive idea of a uniform standard for the empirical validation of theories, it is possible to simply present a set of observational statements—whether we call it "data" or "narrative"—for the modest purpose of rendering an explanation or interpretation more plausible than the audience would allow at the outset. In practice, this is precisely what the most committed positivists and inter-pretivists have been doing anyway; the presentation of "logically consistent" hypotheses "supported by data" and the ordering of facts in a "thick" narrative are both ultimately designed to convince scholars that a particular proposition should be taken more seriously than others. Social analysis is not about final truths or objective realities, but nor does it have to be a meaningless world of incommensurable theories where anything goes. Instead, it can be an ongoing collective endeavor to develop, evaluate, and refine general inferences—be they in the form of models, partial explanations, descriptive inferences, or interpretations—in order to render them more "sensible" or "plausible" to a particular audience. In the absence of a consensus on the possibility and desirability of a full-blown explanatory science of international and social life, it is important to keep as many doors open as possible. This does not require us to accept each and every claim without some sort of validation, but perhaps the community of scholars can be more tolerant about the kinds of empirical referents and logical propositions that are employed in validating propositions by scholars embracing all but the most extreme epistemological positions.

#### Their epistemology K is flawed – social constructions are knowable – they pre-exist individuals and constrain action in predictable ways – prefer the specificity of the aff to broad philosophical indictments

Fluck, PhD in International Politics from Aberystwyth, ’10 (Matthew, November, “Truth, Values and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory” Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol 39 No 2, SagePub)

Critical Realists arrive at their understanding of truth by inverting the post-positivist attitude; rather than asking what knowledge is like and structuring their account of the world accordingly, they assume that knowledge is possible and ask what the world must be like for that to be the case. 36 This position has its roots in the realist philosophy of science, where it is argued that scientists must assume that the theoretical entities they describe – atoms, gravity, bacteria and so on – are real, that they exist independently of thoughts or discourse. 37 Whereas positivists identify causal laws with recurrent phenomena, realists believe they are real tendencies and mechanisms. They argue that the only plausible explanation for the remarkable success of science is that theories refer to these real entities and mechanisms which exist independently of human experience. 38 Against this background, the Critical Realist philosopher Roy Bhaskar has argued that truth must have a dual aspect. On the one hand, it must refer to epistemic conditions and activities such as ‘reporting judgements’ and ‘assigning values’. On the other hand, it has an inescapably ontic aspect which involves ‘designating the states of affairs expressed and in virtue of which judgements are assigned the value “true’’’. In many respects the epistemic aspect must dominate; we can only identify truth through certain epistemic procedures and from within certain social contexts. Nevertheless, these procedures are oriented towards independent reality. The status of the conclusions they lead us to is not dependent on epistemic factors alone, but also on independently existing states of affairs. For this reason, Bhaskar argues that truth has a ‘genuinely ontological’ use. 39 Post-positivists would, of course, reply that whilst such an understanding of truth might be unproblematic in the natural sciences, in the social sciences the knower is part of the object known. This being the case, there cannot be an ontic aspect to the truths identified. Critical Realists accept that in social science there is interaction between subject and object; social structures involve the actions and ideas of social actors. 40 They add, however, that it does not follow that the structures in question are the creations of social scientists or that they are simply constituted through the ideas shared within society at a given moment. 41 According to Bhaskar, since we are born into a world of structures which precede us, we can ascribe independent existence to social structures on the basis of their pre-existence. We can recognise that they are real on the basis of their causal power – they have a constraining effect on our activity. 42 Critical Realists are happy to agree to an ‘epistemological relativism’ according to which knowledge is a social product created from a pre-existing set of beliefs, 43 but they maintain that the reality of social structures means that our beliefs about them can be more or less accurate – we must distinguish between the way things appear to us and the way they really are. There are procedures which enable us to rationally choose between accounts of reality and thereby arrive at more accurate understandings; epistemological relativism does not preclude judgemental rationalism. 44 It therefore remains possible to pursue the truth about social reality.

#### **That’s most ethical – failure of preventative action and predictions drives structural violence and inequality, only actions that act to preserve future generations can resolve power relations**

Kurasawa‘4,

(Fuyuki, Assistant Prof. of Sociology @ York University, Cautionary Tales, Constellations Vol. 11, No. 4, Blackwell Synergy)

In the previous section, I described how the capacity to produce, disseminate, and receive warning signals regarding disasters on the world stage has developed in global civil society. Yet the fact remains that audiences may let a recklessness or insouciance toward the future prevail, instead of listening to and acting upon such warnings. There is no doubt that the short-sightedness and presentism are strong dynamics in contemporary society, which is enveloped by a “temporal myopia” that encourages most individuals to live in a state of chronological self-referentiality whereby they screen out anything that is not of the moment.22 The commercial media, advertising, and entertainment industries are major contributors to this “tyranny of real time”23 that feeds a societal addiction to the ‘live’ and the immediate while eroding the principle of farsightedness. The infamous quip attributed to Madame de Pompadour, ‘après nous, le déluge,’ perfectly captures a sense of utter callousness about the future that represents one of presentism’s most acute manifestations. Two closely related notions underlie it: the belief that we should only concern ourselves with whether our actions, or lack thereof, have deleterious consequences visible to us in the short-to medium-term (temporally limited responsibility); and sheer indifference toward the plight of those who will come after us (generational self-centeredness). Substantively, the two are not much different because they shift the costs and risks of present-day decisions onto our descendants. “The crisis of the future is a measure of the deficiency of our societies, incapable as they are of assessing what is involved in relationships with others,” Bindé writes. “This temporal myopia brings into play the same processes of denial of others as social shortsightedness. The absence of solidarity in time between generations merely reproduces selfishness in space within the same generation.”24 Thus, to the NIMBY (‘not-in-my-back-yard’) politics of the last few decades can be added the ‘not-in-my-lifetime’ or ‘not-to-my-children’ lines of reasoning. For members of dominant groups in the North Atlantic region, disasters are something for others to worry about – that is, those who are socio-economically marginal, or geographically and temporally distant. The variations on these themes are numerous. One is the oft-stated belief that prevention is a luxury that we can scarcely afford, or even an unwarranted conceit. Accordingly, by minimizing the urgency or gravity of potential threats, procrastination appears legitimate. Why squander time, energy, and resources to anticipate and thwart what are, after all, only hypothetical dangers? Why act today when, in any case, others will do so in the future? Why not limit ourselves to reacting to cataclysms if and when they occur? A ‘bad faith’ version of this argument goes even further by seeking to discredit, reject, or deny evidence pointing to upcoming catastrophes. Here, we enter into the domain of deliberate negligence and “culpable ignorance,”25 as manifest in the apathy of US Republican administrations toward climate change or the Clinton White House’s disengenuous and belated responses to the genocides in ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda. At another level, instrumental-strategic forms of thought and action, so pervasive in modern societies because institutionally entrenched in the state and the market, are rarely compatible with the demands of farsightedness. The calculation of the most technically efficient means to attain a particular bureaucratic or corporate objective, and the subsequent relentless pursuit of it, intrinsically exclude broader questions of long-term prospects or negative side-effects. What matters is the maximization of profits or national self-interest with the least effort, and as rapidly as possible. Growing risks and perils are transferred to future generations through a series of trade-offs: economic growth versus environmental protection, innovation versus safety, instant gratification versus future well-being. What can be done in the face of short-sightedness? Cosmopolitanism provides some of the clues to an answer, thanks to its formulation of a universal duty of care for humankind that transcends all geographical and socio-cultural borders. I want to expand the notion of cosmopolitan universalism in a temporal direction, so that it can become applicable to future generations and thereby nourish a vibrant culture of prevention. Consequently, we need to begin thinking about a farsighted cosmopolitanism, a chrono-cosmopolitics that takes seriously a sense ¶ of “intergenerational solidarity” toward human beings who will live in our wake as much as those living amidst us today.26 But for a farsighted cosmopolitanism to take root in global civil society, the latter must adopt a thicker regulative principle of care for the future than the one currently in vogue (which amounts to little more than an afterthought of the non-descript ‘don’t forget later generations’ ilk). Hans Jonas’s “imperative of responsibility” is valuable precisely because it prescribes an ethico-political relationship to the future consonant with the work of farsightedness.27 Fully appreciating Jonas’s position requires that we grasp the rupture it establishes with the presentist assumptions imbedded in the intentionalist tradition of Western ethics. In brief, intentionalism can be explained by reference to its best-known formulation, the Kantian categorical imperative, according to which the moral worth of a deed depends upon whether the a priori “principle of the will” or “volition” of the person performing it – that is, his or her intention – should become a universal law.28 Ex post facto evaluation of an act’s outcomes, and of whether they correspond to the initial intention, is peripheral to moral judgment. A variant of this logic is found in Weber’s discussion of the “ethic of absolute ends,” the “passionate devotion to a cause” elevating the realization of a vision of the world above all other considerations; conviction without the restraint of caution and prudence is intensely presentist.29 By contrast, Jonas’s strong consequentialism takes a cue from Weber’s “ethic of responsibility,” which stipulates that we must carefully ponder the potential impacts of our actions and assume responsibility for them – even for the incidence of unexpected and unintended results. Neither the contingency of outcomes nor the retrospective nature of certain moral judgments exempts an act from normative evaluation. On the contrary, consequentialism reconnects what intentionalism prefers to keep distinct: the moral worth of ends partly depends upon the means selected to attain them (and vice versa), while the correspondence between intentions and results is crucial. At the same time, Jonas goes further than Weber in breaking with presentism by advocating an “ethic of long-range responsibility” that refuses to accept the future’s indeterminacy, gesturing instead toward a practice of farsighted preparation for crises that could occur.30 From a consequentialist perspective, then, intergenerational solidarity would consist of striving to prevent our endeavors from causing large-scale human suffering and damage to the natural world over time. Jonas reformulates the categorical imperative along these lines: “Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life,” or “Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life.”31 What we find here, I would hold, is a substantive and future-oriented ethos on the basis of which civic associations can enact the work of preventive foresight.

#### Ethic of farsightedness key to solve all global threats – even if our specific predictions are bad, future-oriented projections are a good method and a DA to the alt

Kurasawa 4

(Fuyuki, Assistant Prof. of Sociology @ York University, Cautionary Tales, *Constellations* Vol. 11, No. 4, Blackwell Synergy)

In addition, farsightedness has become a priority in world affairs due to the appearance of new global threats and the resurgence of ‘older’ ones. Virulent forms of ethno-racial nationalism and religious fundamentalism that had mostly been kept in check or bottled up during the Cold War have reasserted themselves in ways that are now all-too-familiar – civil warfare, genocide, ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and global terrorism. And if nuclear mutually assured destruction has come to pass, other dangers are filling the vacuum: climate change, AIDS and other diseases (BSE, SARS, etc.), as well as previously unheralded genomic perils (genetically modified organisms, human cloning). Collective remembrance of past atrocities and disasters has galvanized some sectors of public opinion and made the international community’s unwillingness to adequately intervene before and during the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or to take remedial steps in the case of the spiraling African and Asian AIDS pandemics, appear particularly glaring.

#### **Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative – Scenario Planning is consistent with complexity theory**

KAVALSKI ‘7 (Emilian; University of Alberta, “The fifth debate and the emergence of complex international relations theory: notes on the application of complexity theory to the study of international life,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, v. 20 n. 3, September)

In a further examination of the cognitive perspective, some proponents of CIR theory have suggested ‘scenarios’ as tools for the modelling of complexity (Feder 2002; Harcourt and Muliro 2004). Scenarios are defined as ‘imaginative stories of the future that describe alternative ways the present might evolve over a given period of time’ (Heinzen 2004, 4). They focus on subjective interpretations and perceptions. Understanding complexity, therefore, would depend on the relationship between the ‘cognitive schema’ (that is, available knowledge) and the ‘associative network’ (that is, the activation of the links between different concepts) of the observer (Bradfield 2004, 40). The suggestion is that in some sense ‘we create our own consciousness of complexity by seeking it out’ (LaPorte 1975, 329). In this respect, some proponents of CIR theory have asserted the analysis of discourses as an important distinction between human and nonhuman complex systems (Geyer 2003b, 26).14

The intellectual considerations of these epistemological frameworks suggest the challenging conceptual and methodological problems facing CIR theory. On a metatheoretical level, the problem stems from the realization that students of the complexity of international life can never be fully cognizant of the underlying truths, principles and processes that ‘govern reality’ because this would (i) involve (a degree of) simplification of complex phenomena (LaPorte 1975, 50), as well as (ii) imply ‘knowing the not knowable’ (Cioffi-Revilla 1998, 11). As suggested, analytically, the conscious consideration of complexity is hindered by the inherent difficulty of formalizing uncertainty and contingency (Whitman 2005, 105). Some commentators, therefore, have rejected the possibility of constructing comprehensive models for the study of complexity altogether in an attempt to overcome the trap of having to justify their methodologies in ways that are understandable to conventional IR. Therefore, a number of CIR proponents rely on ‘sensemaking’ (Browaeys and Baets 2003, 337; Coghill 2004, 53), ‘whatiffing’ (Beaumont 1994, 171) and other forms of ‘speculative thinking’ (Feder 2002, 114) for their interpretations of the complexity of international life. The claim is that the acceptance of endogeneity as a ‘fact’ of international life provides more insightful modes of analysis than the linear-regression-type approach of traditional IR (Johnston 2005 1040). Without ignoring some controversial aspects of incorporating ontological and epistemological reflection into methodological choices, the claim here is that CIR theory suggests intriguing heuristic devices that both challenge conventional wisdom and provoke analytical imaginations.

Complex international relations theory, therefore, proffers analytical tools both for explaining and understanding discontinuities. It is claimed that its approaches offer ‘antidotes’ to the anxiety that randomness engenders in traditional IR as well as provide a paradigm that accepts uncertainty as inevitable (Feder 2002, 117). Thus, in contrast to the typically linear perceptions of change in mainstream IR— that is, changes in variables occur, but the effect is constant—CIR suggests that ‘things suffer change’. The contention is that the unpredictability of the emergent patterns of international life needs to be conceptualized within the framework of self-organizing criticality—that is, their dynamics ‘adapt to, or are themselves on, the edge of chaos, and most of the changes take place through catastrophic events rather than by following a smooth gradual path’ (Dunn 2007, 99). Complex international relations, in other words, suggests that change entails the possibility of a ‘radical qualitative effect’ (Richards 2000, 1). Therefore, the alleged arbitrariness of occurrences that conventional IR might describe as the effects of randomness (or exogenous/surprising shocks) could (and, in fact, more often than not does) reflect ignorance of their interactions. In fact, the reference to ‘chance’ is merely a metaphor for our lack of knowledge of the dynamics of complexity (Smith and Jenks 2006, 273).

In this respect, CIR theory sketches the fifth debate in the study of international life (see Table 2). Its outlines follow the proposition of the Gulbenkian Commission to break down the division between ‘natural’ and ‘social’ sciences, since both are pervaded by ‘complexity’. Therefore, scholars should not be ‘conceiving of humanity as mechanical, but rather instead conceiving nature as active and creative [to make] the laws of nature compatible with the idea of novelty and of creativity’ (Wallerstein 1996, 61–63). Complex international relations (unlike other IR approaches) acknowledges that patterns of international life are panarchic ‘hybrids’ of physical and social relations (Urry 2003, 18) and advocates such fusion (through the dissolution of the outdated distinction) of scientific realities (Whitman 2005, 45–64). Its complex adaptive thinking in effect challenges the very existence of ‘objective standards’ for the assessment of competing knowledge claims, because these are ‘not nature’s, but rather always human standards, standards which are not given but made . . . adopted by convention by the members of a specific community’ (Hoffmann and Riley 2002, 304). The complex adaptive thinking of CIR theory, therefore, is an instance of ‘true thinking’—‘thinking that looks disorder and uncertainty straight in the face’ (Smith and Jenks 2006, 4).